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Most evaluations conclude that state and local business financing efforts to stimulate 
economic development in distressed areas outside big cities have little influence on either the 
level or the distribution of economic growth. The studies show that programs without 
specific geographic targets are used disproportionately by businesses in growing areas of a 
state, rather than in distressed areas, but have no measurable effects on the growth of the 
state economy. Programs aimed at specific distressed geographic areas show almost no 
effects on the growth of these areas. 1 
The evaluations leave economic development planners and policy makers without 
insight about why programs have no effects or what they should do to make programs more 
successful in encouraging growth in distressed areas--the programs' explicit aim. Where the 
evaluations do offer policy direction, the recommendations reflect primarily the framework of 
neoclassical economic theory. Because these programs seek to influence economic activity, 
such recommendations are useful. However, programs that state and local government 
officials implement are political as well as economic, and programmatic changes that are 
likely to have the most effects on program outcomes must emerge from understanding the 
political economy of programs, not just their economics. 
This paper draws on a study of an economic development program, Minnesota's 
Small Cities Economic Development Program, to assess three possible explanations for the 
poor results of state and local programs to stimulate the economies of distressed areas. State 
1Margaret E. Dewar, "Tax Incentives and Public Loans and Subsidies: What Difference Do They Make in 
Nonmetropolitan Economic Development?" in Richard D. Bingham, Edward W. Hill, and Sammis B. White, 
eds., Financing Economic Development (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990). Exceptions exist when the area 
designated as distressed is so small that a program can influence a decision to locate or expand on one side of a 
border rather than another and therefore can produce an effect on the distressed area. 
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and local economic development officials implemented the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program in some ways that could stimulate economic growth, but their actions 
were often inconsistent with achieving the economic development goals of the program. 
Consistent with findings of evaluations of other such programs, the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program has had few effects on economic growth or on redistribution to 
distressed areas. 2 
This paper first describes the Small Cities Economic Development Program and 
enumerates its explicit goals. The paper then assesses three possible frameworks for 
explaining the ineffectiveness qf the program in achieving those goals. Finally, the paper 
makes recommendations for helping this type of program achieve such goals more 
successfully, if indeed these goals are the desired purpose. 
Minnesota's Small Cities Economic Development Program 
The Small Cities Economic Development Program provides financing for businesses 
and projects related to businesses, such as infrastructure improvements. A local government 
applies to the state agency, the Department of Trade and Economic Development (DTED), 
for a grant on behalf of a specific business. The local jurisdiction usually lends the money to 
the business, although some businesses receive grants. When the business repays the loan, 
the local government deposits some or all of each grant plus interest in a revolving loan fund 
for economic development. 3 
2Margaret E. Dewar, "Inside State and Local Economic Development Programs: The Record of Minnesota's 
Small Cities Economic Development Program," Working Paper 91-1, State and Regional Research Center, 
Univers~ty of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN, Feb. 1991; Margaret E. Dewar and Beth Hagenlocker, "Getting to the 
Bottom Line on Low-Interest Loans to Business: An Evaluation of Minnesota's Small Cities Economic 
Development Program," unpublished paper, May 1992. 
3Minnesota Department of Energy and Economic Development (DEED), "Minnesota Small Cities Economic 
Development Program Application Manual," St. Paul, MN, Jan. 1986. 
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The program has two major sources of funds. One is the state-administered allocation 
of federal Small Cities Development Program grants, a part of the Community Development 
Block Grant program. The other is the state's Economic Recovery Grants, a program 
created in 1984 to supplement the federal funds. Any jurisdiction can apply for funds under 
the state program. Indian tribes and the state's largest cities and urban counties are not 
eligible to receive funds from the federal part of the program because they may receive 
Community Development Block Grant funds directly from the U. S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development.4 
From 1984 through late 1988 the Small Cities Economic Development Program 
received annual funding between $8 million and $9 million (of this, between $5 million and 
$6 million came from the state and approximately $3 million came from the federal 
government). During this period, the program's administrators approved grants to 162 cities, 
counties, townships, and Indian reservations, although five of these jurisdictions later 
received no funding when projects did not occur as planned. The administrators approved a 
total of 205 grants; eight of these were later terminated with virtually no funds spent. Local 
jurisdictions offered financing to or prepared to undertake projects on behalf of 209 
businesses; nine of these businesses ultimately received no financing; ten businesses received 
more than one grant or loan. The loans or grants to businesses ranged from $10,000 to the 
legal limit of $500,000.5 
4Minnesota Statutes, ch. 1161.873 "Economic Recovery Grants"; Minnesota Rules, ch. 4300; "Minnesota 
Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," especially p. 1; U.S. Code 42, ch. 69, 
"Community Development"; Code of Federal Regulations 24, ch. 5, subch. C, pt. 570, 1 April 1988. 
5Grants approved for 209 businesses and additional grants approved for 10 of the same businesses meant 
DTED approved funds on 219 occasions for a business or a project in support of a business. Mike Auger, 
Director, Small Cities Economic Development Program, Community Development Division, Minnesota 
Department of Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN, personal communication with the author, Feb. 
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For several reasons, the Small Cities Economic Development Program is a useful 
vehicle for assessing political-economic explanations for the ineffectiveness of state and local 
efforts to stimulate economic development in distressed areas through business subsidies. 
First, the program is a common type, so findings should be helpful in understanding many 
programs. As of 1986 twenty-six states offered direct loans to businesses, and fourteen 
offered grants. Other states have used the federal Small Cities Development Program for. 
similar efforts. The Small Cities Economic Development Program is also similar in design 
to the federal Urban Development Action Grant program that operated from the late 1970s 
through the late 1980s.6 
A second reason for examining the Small Cities Economic Development Program is 
that the program is supposed to respond to community distress and help low- and moderate-
income people, in part because of its connection with the federal Community Development 
Block Grant program. The program is more likely than less targeted efforts to deal with two 
issues of importance to many state and local governments--regional decline and economic 
distress. 
1988; data collected from the project files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program, Minnesota 
Department of Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN; Julia Mason Friedman, "Improving Capital 
Market Efficiency Through State Programs," Research Paper E in The Report of the Governor's Commission 
on the Economic Future of Minnesota (St. Paul: Department of Trade and Economic Development, 1987), p. 
147. 
6National Association of State Development Agencies et al., Directory of Incentives for Business Investment 
and Development in the United States: A State-by-State Guide (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1983 
and 1986); The Capital Group, Office of Federal Grant Management, "Final Program Statement: 1988 Michigan 
Community Development Block Grant Program," (Lansing: Michigan Department of Commerce, n.d.); Edward 
T. Jennings, Jr. et al., eds., From Nation to States: The Small Cities Community Development Block Grant 
Program (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); Marie Howland and Ted Miller, "Urban 
Development Action Grants to Rural Communities," Project Report, Urban Institute, Washington, DC, May 
1988. 
5 
Third, the Small Cities Economic Development Program has existed longer than any 
other major state economic development program in Minnesota. As in every state, a large 
share of Minnesota's economic development efforts are short-lived. Survival and longevity 
mean data exist (albeit often in the form of voluminous written materials in file cabinets 
rather than computer-ready numbers), the program has results to be explained, and a history 
exists to draw upon for identifying political-economic explanations for the outcomes of the 
program. 
On the other hand, the findings regarding the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program may not apply directly to some other programs. The Small Cities Economic 
Development Program's longevity suggests it may differ in important respects from other 
efforts. Even in these cases, however, the insights from this research are potentially 
relevant. The close look at the Small Cities Economic Development Program suggests why 
it lasted when other programs did not and thus helps reveal why other programs did not 
survive long enough to have a chance of success. 
Generalizations. regarding the workings of the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program are most applicable to programs that a state agency directs rather than those 
initiated by a local jurisdiction. Explanations for success or failure of programs where state 
enabling legislation leaves the responsibility for participation with local decisionmakers--as 
when local jurisdictions decide to issue industrial revenue bonds or set up tax increment 
financing districts--can draw on some of the ideas discussed here but should place greater 
emphasis on local political and economic conditions. 7 
'Margaret Dewar, Glenn Nelson, and Thomas Stinson, "The Political Character of Targeted Area 
Development: Implications for Designers, Evaluators, and Managers" Staff Paper, State and Regional Research 
Center, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN, forthcoming. 
6 
The primary objective of the Small Cities Economic Development Program is "the 
development of viable urban communities, by ... expanding economic opportunities, 
principally for persons of low and moderate income. "8 The Economic Recovery Grants are 
"to create new employment, maintain existing employment, increase the local tax base, or 
otherwise increase economic activity in a community. "9 Every project is to "benefit low-
and moderate-income persons," to "prevent slums and blight," or to "alleviate urgent 
community development needs. "10 Every project is to meet two of three state economic 
development objectives: "crea!ion or retention of permanent private sector jobs," "stimulation 
or leverage of private investment," or "increase in local tax base." Program administrators 
are to consider the community's "economic vulnerability" and need for employment 
opportunities and to evaluate the project's potential to reduce or eliminate this need. 11 In 
addition to these aims stated in legislation and regulations, the governor and the 
commissioner of DTED (previously the Department of Energy and Economic Development--
DEED) touted the program as creating jobs for the state, and state job creation became an 
important program goal. 12 
8U.S. Code 42, ch. 69, sec. 5301c; see also, Minnesota Rules, ch. 4300, pt. 0300. 
9Minnesota Statutes, ch. 1161.873, subd. 2. 
1°Minnesota Rules, ch. 4300, pt. 0300. 
11Minnesota Rules, ch. 4300, pt. 1901. 
12"Dayton says state's business climate improved in 1983," Minneapolis Star Tribune, 2 Mar. 1984; Lynda 
McDonnell and Steven Thomma, "Economic development schooled in hard knocks," St. Paul Pioneer Press 
Dispatch, 2 Mar. 1986; Steven Thomma and Lynda McDonnell, "Rosy figures of job agency don't add up," St. 
Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 2 Mar. 1986; "Perpich says his strategy created, saved many jobs," St. Paul 
Pioneer Press Dispatch, 17 July 1986; "Perpich compiles list of firms aided during last three years," 
Minneapolis Star Tribune, 4 Oct. 1986. 
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During the period examined, from the program's birth in 1984 through late 1988, the 
Small Cities Economic Development Program took some actions that could lead to achieving 
these goals but neglected many others. The program took some actions contrary to those 
needed to achieve the programs' explicit aims. The activities of the program were consistent 
with evaluations that show little or no effect on a state's economy, distressed areas, and poor 
people.13 
Why the Unimpressive Results? 
The following sections pose three explanatory frameworks for understanding why the 
Small Cities Economic Development Program, or any similar economic development 
program, has so little effect on state and local economies. The explanations reflect a 
"technocratic" perspective, a "bureaucratic" perspective, and a view of the political 
imperatives in a private enterprise society. The activities of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program are consistent with each perspective in some ways and inconsistent in 
others. The next sections discuss each explanation· for the program's results and present 
evidence consistent and inconsistent with that explanation to draw conclusions about the 
usefulness of each perspective for understanding the outcomes of state and local economic 
development efforts. 
The Technocratic Perspective. 
From a technocratic viewpoint, an important answer to why the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program was not more successful is that the program's designers and 
implementers did not know what to do to achieve the program's goals, did not apply existing 
13Dewar, "Inside State and Local Economic Development Programs"; Margaret E. Dewar, "Loans to 
Business to Encourage Rural Economic Development,• Policy Studies Journal 20, no. 2 (spring 1992). 
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knowledge of what kind of program can be most effective and what makes a program work, 
did not use appropriate analysis, and did not have information they needed to make better 
decisions. If the designers and implementers acted more wisely, the program could be more 
successful, or a more promising effort could replace the current program. 
The technocratic perspective has a major influence on the thinking in public affairs, 
urban and regional planning, public policy, and applied economics. • As a recent 
advertisement for the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management stated, "Better public 
policy is unquestionably a function of better information." "No sensible policy choice can be 
made [in many cases] without careful analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
course of action," states a leading text. "By improving our ability to predict the 
consequences of alternative policies, and providing a framework for valuing those 
consequences, the techniques of policy analysis lead us toward better decisions. "14 The 
potential is "to inform decision makers well enough so that a more enlightened discussion of 
public policy occurs and better policy is adopted as a result. "15 
How does the technocratic explanation fit the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program's experience? The program was designed and implemented with little analytic input 
and no analysis of alternative policies for achieving the same ends. As the bill to create the 
Economic · Recovery Grants progressed through the state legislature and as the regulations 
14Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 
pp. ix, 329. 
15Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki, Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986), p. 4. See also, Edward J. Blakely, Planning Local Economic Development: Theory 
and Practice (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), p. 290; Avrom Bendavid-Val, Regional and Local Economic 
Analysis for Practitioners (New York: Praeger, 1991); David S. Sawicki, "The Festival Marketplace as Public 
Policy: Guidelines for Future Policy Decisions," Journal of the American Planning Association 55, no. 3 
(Summer 1989). 
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were written, knowledge about how to encourage growth was not applied.16 As a result, 
achieving economic growth would be accidental unless the implementors independently 
incorporated such knowledge into their actions, and improving the welfare of distressed 
regions might be less effective than with alternative programs. 
The staff who implemented the program did not introduce measures to assure that.the 
program achieved its economic growth goals either for the state as a whole or for specific 
communities. The program application manual showed almost no attention to assessing how 
to stimulate more growth for the state than would have occurred without the program. Staff 
did almost no assessment of whether a project would bring about more growth for the state 
than no project or alternative projects. In one case, they even approved funding to a city on 
behalf of a branch plant when the city was involved in a highly publicized competition for 
the plant among northern Twin Cities suburbs. 17 
Staff requested no analysis of whether a project would bring about actual growth in a 
community. An application did not need to address the possibility that no action or 
alternative projects might bring about more growth than the proposed effort. Applicants 
needed to report before and after measures of tax base change, for instance, but did not have 
to consider how the tax base would change if the program did not intervene. If an 
16 Patricia Liefert, "The Origins of the Economic Recovery Grant Program" (A Plan B paper submitted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Public Affairs, University of 
Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, Aug. 1988). 
17Dewar, "Inside State and Local Economic Development Programs"; file on Blaine, NCR-Comten, Small 
Cities Economic Development Program, Department of Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN; Paul 
Gustafson and Jim Adams, "Suburbs all roll out their red carpets for business," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 
30 Jan. 1986, p. lY; Deets Mittelstadt, NCR-Comten, personal communication with Kimberlie Garg, winter 
1989. NCR-Comten later declined to use the funds from the Small Cities Economic Development Program 
because of the hiring requirements. 
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understanding of the sources of economic change had influenced the program 
implementation, the program could have had more significant results. 18 
Although the technocratic view seems important in accounting for the effects of the 
program on economic growth, the perspective is less satisfactory in explaining the program's 
failure to redistribute economic activity to the most distressed areas of the state. The 
program's staff did not distribute funds in ways that reflected the information on economic 
distress that they used. Although they did know what to do to accomplish redistribution to 
distressed areas and although they said they were doing this, the results were poor. The 
distribution of funds only weakly correlated with the staff's measures of distress. Counties 
with higher unemployment rates and with higher poverty rates and lower median incomes in 
1979 tended to receive more grant funds per capita. However, less distressed counties 
received more funds than more distressed ones. The 30 percent of counties with the lowest 
poverty rates in 1979 received 42 percent of all program funds; the 50 percent of counties 
with the lowest poverty rates received nearly 60 percent of total program funds granted to 
communities. 19 
Part of the reason for the bias of funding toward more prosperous counties was that 
the evaluation of applications did not place enough importance on economic distress. Other 
project characteristics could give an application enough points--up to 440--to exceed the 400 
points required for funding without a project's doing well on the measures of community 
distress. 
18Dewar, "Inside State and Local Economic Development Programs." 
19Ibid. 
11 
Further, the measures of local economic distress did not do well in discriminating 
among applications from more distressed areas and more prosperous ones. A community's 
application earned 80 points (the maximum possible based on statistical measures of distress) 
for annual unemployment, the preceding quarter's unemployment, and poverty if the county's 
rates exceeded the state's, and for median income if the county's 1979 median family income 
was less than the state's. Most counties were more distressed than the state as a whole 
because the prosperous, more densely populated Twin Cities and Rochester areas lowered 
unemployment and poverty figures and raised state median income. The poorest counties 
· gained no advantage in this system compared to ones that were only slightly less well off 
than the state averages. 
An application could earn up to 80 additional points on the basis of staffs judgment 
of a narrative of community need. Several of the conditions that staff looked for could have 
little to do with economic distress. These included "need to attract or retain essential 
services," "events contributing to a unique situation," and "opportunity or timeliness to 
implement project. "20 
The technocratic perspective's explanations are most unsatisfactory, however, in 
consideration of two questions. First, if the distribution of grants did not reflect the pattern 
of distress, did they show another pattern, and if so, what? Second, did the fact that 
knowledge about how to encourage economic growth was not introduced into the design or 
implementation of the program determine the failure to bring about growth? 
20"Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," p. 21. 
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The distribution of grants did show strong geographic patterns. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of grants across the state for the nearly four years this study covered. St. Louis 
County which includes the Iron Range, the home of the governor and several senior 
legislators, received twenty grants, many more than any other part of the state. The Iron 
Range suffered severely from the collapse of the market for iron ore in the early 1980s. In 
spring 1983 the unemployment rate reached a high of 33 percent.21 However, despite the 
region's problems in the early 1980s, the area was not more depressed than many other parts 
of the state by 1986. As of 1986 St. Louis County ranked eighteenth highest out of 87 
counties in average earnings per job, although in part because unemployment was still high 
(9.1 percent compared to 5.3 percent for the state--the fourteenth highest county 
unemployment rate), the county ranked fifty-eighth highest among the counties in personal 
income per capita. 22 The county did better than these rankings in funding received; 66 
counties received fewer grant dollars per capita.23 The county was not "distressed" in 1987 
according to criteria that legislation directed the Department of Trade and Economic 
Development to use. 24 When wages were adjusted for estimated living costs, "real" wages 
21Unemployment rate for "balance of St. Louis County," excluding Duluth, in "Northeastern Minnesota 
Labor Market Review," Minnesota Department of Economic Security, Duluth, MN, monthly 1982-84. 
220.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, regional economic profile data for Minnesota, unpublished; Minnesota 
Department of Jobs and Training, "State and Area Labor Force Estimates, January 1980-December 1987," 
Research and Statistics Office, St. Paul, MN, Aug. 1988 (revised Sept. 1988). 
23If St. Louis County had received funding consistent with its average earnings per job, only 17 counties 
would have received fewer dollars per capita. If St. Louis County had received funding on the basis of per 
capita income, 57 counties would have received fewer program dollars per capita. 
24Lee Munnich to Joe Samargia and Thomas Gillaspy, memorandum regarding distressed county data and 
attachments, 28 July 1988. A county designated as "economically distressed" in July 1988 either (1) had an 
unemployment rate over 10 percent for May 1987-April 1988, or (2) had an unemployment rate 10 percent 
above the statewide unemployment rate and had at least 20 percent of employment in agriculture-related 
industries. 
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Figure 1. Number of Small Cities Economic Development 
Program Grants by County, 1984-1988 
Number of Grants 
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Source: Minnesota Department of Trade and Economic Development, Small Cities 
Economic Development Program. 
14 
in northeastern Minnesota (including several counties in addition to St. Louis) were the 
highest in the state in 1987. 25 
With the exception of seven grants to prosperous Hennepin County (site of 
Minneapolis and suburbs) and a C?ncentration of ten grants in one western county, the other 
grants were scattered throughout the state, not concentrated in particular areas. 
A map of the distribution of the largest grants, $247,500 to ·$500,000,26 shows that 
St. Louis County received many more than any other county (see Figure 2). Sixteen of the 
twenty grants made to communities in St. Louis County were at least $247,500, and these 
made up one-fifth of all large grants the program made. Only five other counties in the state 
received as many as three large grants. 
The distribution of grants by state senate district also shows striking patterns. The 
district of State Senator Douglas Johnson, chair of the Senate Tax Committee, received 18 
grants; five other Senate districts (out of a total of 67 districts) received ten or eleven grants. 
Johnson's district, which included a large part of St. Louis County and all of Lake and Cook 
counties, received one-eighth of the program's grant funds. The senate district receiving the 
next largest amount of grant funds received less than half the funds of Johnson's district. 
Overall, the patterns of geographic distribution of grants by county and legislative 
district suggest that important factors were influencing the distribution of grants that did not 
25Brenda K. Burk, "Regional Consumer Price Comparisons with Specific Application to Minnesota" 
(Master's thesis, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN, 
Jan. 1989), chap. 4. 
2&fhe program's application manual di'scouraged requests for more than $250,000. The legislation limited 
grants to a maximum of $500,000. $247,500 is used because this amount plus an administrative cost allowance 
of $2500 is a $250,000 grant. 
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Figure 2. Number of Large Grants by County, 1984-1988 
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Source: Minnesota Department of Trade and Economic Development, Small Cities 
Economic Development Program. 
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relate closely to economic distress and in fact might relate to distress only by chance. An 
explanation for the failure of an economic development program to achieve its explicit goals 
should include those forces; the technocratic perspective fails to do so. 
Did the fact that the design and implementation of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program did not draw on knowledge about how to bririg about economic 
growth determine the program's failure to produce economic growth? ·would a 
technocratically determined program have been successful? The experience of other 
Minnesota economic development programs suggests that the answer to both questions is no. 
In 1987 several state economic development programs were abolished that had provided 
financing for businesses since 1983. The programs that ended in 1987 did better than the 
Small Cities Program at assuring that a business could not undertake a proposed project 
without the state funding. These programs were also more likely to address capital market 
problems and therefore to bring about state and local economic growth. r, Furthermore, a 
program set up in 1982 to stimulate the Iron Range economy incorporated analysis of 
projects, but the program was eliminated soon after it was established and replaced with a 
program that required less project analysis in general and virtually no analysis of big 
projects. 28 Programs that did incorporate more of the provisions technocrats would 
recommend and that promised to be more successful at achieving their explicit goals of 
27Friedman, "Improving Capital Market Efficiency Through State Programs," p. 147; Jeffrey John 
Schneider, "Capital Market Imperfections and the DEED Economic Development Fund" (A Plan B paper 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Public Affairs, University 
of Minnesota, June 1987). 
28Margaret E. Dewar, "Development Analysis Confronts Politics: Industrial Policy on Minnesota's Iron 
Range," Journal of the American Planning Association 52, no. 3 (Summer 1986). 
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encouraging growth did not survive although the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program, incorporating almost no analysis of how economic growth could be affected, 
continued. Explanations for why programs that incorporated analysis were abolished reveal 
systematic reasons for eliminating economic development analysis. 29 
Ultimately, the technocratic explanation is not sufficient and may not even be 
necessary to understand the failure of economic development programs. This conclusion 
implies that providing information and analysis about how administrators should be running 
the program to bring about economic growth and to redistribute economic activity in the 
ways. explicitly stated in legislation would not necessarily lead to adopting the measures. In 
addition, new procedures, no matter how correct from a technocratic perspective, would not 
make the program successful. Forces other than a lack of knowledge or analysis would 
continue to interfere with achieving the explicit program goals; or, if the program did adhere 
strictly to technocratic criteria, the program would not survive.30 
The Bureaucratic Perspective 
Another possible perspective for explaining the results of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program comes from research on bureaucratic behavior and its effects on 
program results. From this point of view, state and local economic development programs 
do poorly at achieving their explicit goals because the people administering the programs face 
incentives and pursue aims that are at least partially inconsistent with actions needed to make 
the programs encourage economic growth and redistribute income. Rather than trying to 
29J)ewar, "Development Analysis Confronts Politics." 
30por technocratic recommendations for improving the performance of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program, see Dewar, "Inside State and Local Economic Development Programs." 
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achieve these program goals, the program's administrators seek "budgetary security" to avoid 
significant reductions in the agency's budget within the following few years.31 More than 
budget security, some argue, bureaucrats seek to maximize the budget of their program in 
order to increase "salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, and 
output of the bureau," on the condition that the costs of supplying the output expected of the 
bureau are less than the budget.32 To maximize budgets, heads of bureaus "do what they 
can to win favor in the eyes of officials in the legislature and at the highest political levels of 
the administration. "33 Once a program is in place, program administrators "have no more 
important interest than the continuance of the programs they administer"; they become the 
major coalition leaders in favor of the established programs. 34 Assuring budget security, 
guaranteeing continuation of a program, and maximizing budgets make possible the 
functioning of programs, but the activities required also can undermine programs' capacity to 
achieve explicit goals. 
How well does this explanation match the experience of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program? In many ways it fits the story of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program, but in important respects it falls short of providing an adequate 
explanation of the program's results. The discussion below first looks at how the explanation 
31R. Douglas Arnold, Congress and the Bureaucracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 21. 
32William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Airline Atherton, 1971), p. 
38. 
33 Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes A Law (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1977), p. 71. 
34Amold, Congress and the Bureaucracy. p. 51. 
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is consistent with the Small Cities Economic Development Program's history, then looks at 
inconsistencies. 
In Minnesota in the 1980s, program survival had to be a major preoccupation of 
anyone who administered an economic development program in state government. In the 
1984 election, months after the Economic Recovery Grants portion of the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program was initiated and-only a year after other major state 
economic development efforts began, the Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) Party lost control 
of the state House of Representatives to the Independent Republicans (IR). The IR 
leadership focused some of their harshest criticism on the DFL governor's economic 
development programs, a major emphasis in his 1982 election campaign and central to his 
agenda after taking office. The IR leadership vowed to eliminate economic development 
programs. In the 1986 gubernatorial campaign the DFL opponent in the primary; as well as 
the IR candidate, attacked the governor's economic development efforts. By late 1986, when 
the DFL regained control of the House, the governor no longer backed many of the 
programs and proposed a new direction for state economic development policy in the 1987 
legislative session. 35 
After fall 1984 the administrators running economic development programs and the 
staff working in them could not know how long their programs or their jobs would last. 
Administrators of the Small Cities Economic Development Program needed to run it in ways 
35Bill Salisbury, "DFLers on the spot in budget battle,• St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 20 Feb. 1986, p. 
IA; Robert Whereatt, "Latimer criticizes Perpich's jobs claims,• Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 21 June 1986, 
p. IB; Robert Whereatt, "Ludeman challenges Perpich on business,• Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 19 Oct. 
1986, p. IB; Karl Ensign et al., "Re-Thinking Economic Development: The Final Report" (A paper written for 
Policy Process II, University of Minnesota, 10 June 1987), pp. 8-11. 
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that would enable it to survive and, if survival seemed somewhat assured, would stabilize 
funding and staffing. 
How could the program administrators achieve these aims? The program's most 
important constituent was the governor. If he withdrew support while the opposing party 
controlled one house of the legislature, the program would almost certainly not survive. The 
program addressed the governor's concerns in several ways. First, the governor wanted to 
relieve the economic problems of the Iron Range by countering the decline of the iron ore 
mining industry with the introduction of new economic activities. As the earlier discussion 
showed, the Small Cities Economic Development Program sent many grants to the Iron 
Range. Second, the program provided loans to firms engaged in the kinds of activities that 
the governor emphasized for state economic development. For instance, the governor 
promoted the development of alternative energy sources, tourism, and businesses involved in 
international trade as new opportunities for state economic growth.36 More than ten percent 
of the businesses that received funding were engaged in these kinds of activities. Third, 
program staff followed up to provide funding to businesses where the governor offered aid. 
In early 1984, for instance, the governor traveled through southwestern Minnesota and 
discussed financing and other problems with business owners as he sought to defuse 
controversy over Minnesota's "business climate" of higher taxes and higher workers' 
compensation rates than in other states, especially the Dakotas. As the governor wrote to 
one business owner, the state's economic development agency "will do everything it can to 
36For example, "Perpich's vision of Minnesota's future," editorial, Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 12 Feb. 
1983, p. lOA; Governor Perpich's State of the State address, Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 11 Jan. 1985, p. 
4B. 
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provide you with a very attractive financing package." Some of the businesses later applied 
for and received funds. 37 
What effect did such actions have on the results of the program? In some ways the 
· efforts undermined achievement of the goals of the program; in other respects they supported 
the goals. The disproportionate attention to Iron Range projects meant the program helped 
that troubled region but did not do as well at addressing the problems of other distressed 
areas of the state. Of firms that operated in areas of interest to the governor--in tourism, 
alternative energy development, and international trade--half were not in business by mid-
1989 (compared to a business failure rate of about 15 percent for the program as a whole); 
although they were engaged in attractive kinds of activities, the projects were not viable, and 
program funds might have stimulated more growth if spent in other ways. In some cases 
where the governor offered business owners financial assistance, the help was key to keeping 
the businesses in the state or to bringing about a decision to expand in the state rather than 
outside. In these cases the program may have led to more growth in the state than would 
have otherwise occurred. However, so few businesses considered sites outside the state that 
these actions had little impact on the state's growth.38 The overall result was a haphazard 
connection between the program's activities and the kinds of efforts needed to achieve the 
explicit goals of the program. Sometimes activities to achieve the goals of the program were 
37Norman Fey, Fey Industries, Edgerton, MN, telephone communication with Kimberlie Garg, winter 1989; 
Phil McDade, "Huisken grant ok'd by Chandler city council," Murray County Herald, 6 March 1984; Ron 
Huisken, Huisken Meat, Chandler, MN, telephone communication with Kimberlie Garg, winter 1989; files on 
Edgerton, Fey Industries, and on Chandler, Huisken Meat, Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
38See Dewar, "Inside State and Local Economic Development Programs." 
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consistent with efforts that could reinforce the support of the governor; sometimes they were 
not. 
Although he abandoned other economic development programs, the governor 
continued to support the Small Cities Economic Development Program, despite criticism 
from the Independent Republicans and press coverage that appeared to undermine public 
backing. Abolishing other programs responded to the criticism of economic development 
programs although the activities of the Small Cities Economic Development Program had 
come under at least as much fire as the efforts of other programs. 39 
The support of the governor was necessary for the survival and stability of the Small 
Cities Economic Development Program, but his backing was not sufficient to assure the 
program would continue. The program also needed the support of legislators, and the 
program's administrators needed to assure they had that support. Indeed, the governor was 
more likely to continue to support the Small Cities Economic Development Program if it had 
backing in the legislature, for he would not have to compromise as much on other issues he 
. cared about in order to keep economic development efforts intact. 
39Ensign et al., "Re-Thinking Economic Development." Because economic development programs were the 
central focus of Governor Rudy Perpich's administration, they were also the key targets for attack from political 
opponents and choice subjects for newspaper investigations. For example, Steven Thomma and Lynda 
McDonnell, "Rosy figures of job agency don't add up," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 2 March 1986, p. lA; 
Lori Sturdevant, "Recount ordered of jobs produced by state's action," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 4 March 
1986, p. lB; "State agency's job figures appear to be inflated," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 3 March 1986, 
p. 13A; Lynda McDonnell and Steven Thomma, "State loan programs get down to business." St. Paul Pioneer 
Press Dispatch, 2 March 1986, p. 13A; Bill Salisbury, "Perpich says his strategy created, saved many jobs," St. 
Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 17 July 1986, p. lC; Betty Wilson, "Sparks may fly in Perpich-Latimer debate," 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 7 Aug. 1986, p. lB; Lynda McDonnell, "Economists, Perpich at odds over 
jobs," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 25 Aug. 1986, p. lA; Betty Wilson, "Ludeman continues attack on 
Perpich policies," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 19 Sept. 1986, p. 4B; Robert Whereatt, "Ludeman challenges 
Perpich on business," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 19 Oct. 1986. p. lB. 
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Administrators' concerns about legislative support were evident in several ways. Staff 
of the Small Cities Economic Development Program requested information about legislative 
district on the application form and kept computerized lists of projects by legislative district. 
By late 1988 at least one project had been funded in every senate district outside the Twin 
Cities metropolitan area and the cities of St. Cloud, Rochester, and Duluth; of these areas 
only St. Cloud had received no grants from the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program. All but eight of the other 63 house districts had received funds. 
Information on legislative district was useful in at least two ways in gaining senators' 
and representatives' votes for the program's appropriation and in preventing the elimination 
of the program. First, the program staff offered legislators the opportunity to announce the 
award of grants to communities in their districts. Many legislators did make the 
announcements of the Small Cities Economic Development Program funding, and local 
newspapers reported this news. 40 
Second, information on where the grants went was also useful in lobbying. A 
lobbyist from the Community Development Division (which included the· Small Cities 
Economic Development Program) told a lobbyist from another department that he had no 
trouble getting money from the legislature for the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program because so many legislators had benefited from it. How could such a lobbying 
process work? Armed with a list of the projects, the number of jobs associated with them, 
and letters of thanks from local businesses and elected officials, a lobbyist could show a 
legislator what the program had done for his or her district and promise more if the 
«IMinnesota local newspapers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN. 
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program's funding continued. As the lobbyist from the other department observed, this was 
the style of the U. S. Department of Defense at work in Minnesota; funds were distributed 
among so many districts that virtually all legislators had a stake in the program and wanted 
.. 
the funding to continue. 41 
The lobbying process became visible when in one case the commissioner of the 
Department of Energy and Economic Development used it badly. The commissioner sent to 
the Independent-Republican Speaker of the House a copy of a letter from a mayor, one of the 
Speaker's constituents. The letter thanked the commissioner for helping the city attract a 
major corporation to the city. The commissioner attached a memo that said, "Just something 
for you to consider as you move to eliminate our department's funding." The Speaker 
responded publicly, "Don't threaten me. I don't make decisions about what's good for 
Minnesota based on threats from you or any other politician. "42 
Information the economic development department staff prepared for the legislature 
on the Small Cities Economic Development Program for the 1986 legislative session 
exaggerated the number of jobs and the amount of private financing associated with the 
program. The program's performance was overstated even under the extreme assumption 
that the program was responsible for all the jobs and private investments associated with 
funded projects. The rosy portrayal suggests that the program staff needed to make the key 
indicators of interest to legislators and the public look as good as possible. News reports 
41Sarah Stoesz, assistant to the commissioner, Minnesota Department of Jobs and Training, personal 
communication with the author, 1988-89. 
42Liz Fedor, "Moe, Jennings swap blasts on economic development effort," news clipping in the files of the 
library of the Department of Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN. 
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showed that only 70 percent of the jobs claimed could be documented.43 In addition, the 
agency had approved projects with only two-thirds of the private funding they reported; their 
calculation of "private" funds included public funds from sources other than the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program.44 
How did the need to assure legislative support affect the program's success in 
achieving. its explicit goals? Concerns about what actions actually bring about economic 
growth or redistribute funds to more distressed areas had to be less important than addressing 
the interests of legislators. Grants were distributed across the state's legislative districts 
rather than allocated to businesses where the effects on economic growth might have been 
greater or concentrated in areas where the local economic conditions were worst. 
Legislative support for the Small Cities Economic Development Program remained 
strong. Furthermore, the deputy commissioner for community development, under whose 
purview the Small Cities Economic Development Program fell, was popular with legislators 
and closely connected with the majority leader of the senate; these relationships safeguarded 
the Small Cities Economic Development Program. The Community Development Division 
gained new programs for rural development, and the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program maintained a somewhat stable budget as other economic development programs 
were attacked and eliminated in 1987. When the commissioner of the Department of Trade 
and Economic Development introduced the deputy commissioner for community development 
43Thomma and McDonnell, "Rosy figures of job agency don't add up." The effort to make the program 
look especially good backfired when the press exposed the exaggeration of the number of jobs created and 
saved. 
44Minnesota Department of Energy and Economic Development, report on economic development programs 
prepared during the legislative session, winter 1986; files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
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to a legislative committee in early 1989, the legislators applauded, not the response 
administrators normally received and more enthusiasm than accorded other administrators 
introduced at the same time. A legislative committee later in the same session adopted a bill 
that eliminated the office of the commissioner of the Department of Trade and Economic 
Development and designated the deputy commissioner for community development the top 
official in the department. Although the legislation did not become law, the action signified 
support for the deputy commissioner as well as discontent with the commissioner. The chair 
of the house committee on economic development, considering what program changes to 
propose in the 1990 legislature, said that although little academic support existed for the 
kinds of programs the Community Development Division offered, the deputy commissioner 
for community development had too much support for anyone to touch his programs. When 
an ~ candidate won the gubernatorial election in 1990, the deputy commissioner for 
community development predicted he would keep his high-ranking position in the Department 
of Trade and Economic Development because Independent Republicans had also benefited 
from and supported the Small Cities Economic Development Program and other programs in 
his division. He was right; he became one of few high-level political appointees to survive 
the transition from the DFL governorship to the new IR administration in early 1991.45 
The Small Cities Economic Development Program also needed the support of opinion 
leaders. Opposition of local newspapers and visible citizens groups could undermine the 
backing from legislators and the governor. To preserve public support, the administrators of 
the program presented a "public story" of how the program worked. Projects that the Small 
45Ensign et al., "Re-Thinking Economic Development"; Gary Dawson, "House budget panel cuts Speer 
trade office," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 27 April 1989, p. lB. 
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Cities Economic Development Program funded were initiated by communities, they said. 
Some exceptions, the administrators continued, stemmed from the fact that before other 
economic development programs were eliminated in 1987, business finance specialists 
traveled the state to meet with business managers to discuss participation in programs; their 
work stimulated some applications. If more applications came from some parts of the state 
than others, however, that was because some communities proposed more. The staff of the 
program did not solicit applications. After local jurisdictions applied, a point system 
determined which proposals were eligible to receive funding; little of the point system was 
subjective. The staff funded every project that earned at least 400 points out of a possible 
600 as long as funds were available. The program ran out of money before the end of each 
fiscal year. However, because the state and federal fiscal years ended at different times, 
funds from at least one source were usually available. Lack of funds was the only reason a 
good project did not get money. The staff received no applications for unacceptable projects 
because in preliminary discussions the staff told business owners and community leaders 
when a project was unlikely to get funding. The administrators stated that no one made a 
full application who was not likely to get funds.46 
The director of the Small Cities Economic Development Program said he was not sure 
exactly why his program had survived the demise of so many other economic development 
programs. However, he said, the Small Cities Economic Development Program was able to 
46For example, see Christie Ackerson, "Economic development discussed at seminar," Becker County 
Record, 3 April 1988, p. 6A; David J: Speer, "Economic development system's in good shaP.e," St. Paul 
Pioneer Press Dispatch, 15 June 1987, p. 13A; Bob Cary, "Mark Dayton says: 'We're here to help,'" my 
Echo, 26 March 1984, pp. 1, 2; Mark Dayton, letter to the editor, Ely Echo, 9 April 1984, p. 6A; Auger, 
personal communication with the author, Feb. 1988. 
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respond to communities quickly. Within two weeks the program could give a response to an 
application. Programs that were eliminated had been more concerned about business 
financing issues than community development. A board that had to approve projects met 
only once a month. A decision could take several months. 47 
This public story was incomplete. It was inconsistent in many respects with the 
administrative imperative to deal with the concerns of the governor and legislators in order to 
keep the program going. The point system for rating applications gave the staff basis for 
judging projects and providing justification for decisions on projects. It also allowed 
considerable flexibility in funding projects. Many projects could earn the 400 of a possible 
600 points to be eligible for funding. Staff could allocate more points or revise upward the 
points an application received when a project needed to be funded for political reasons. The 
Small Cities Economic Development Program did not always respond quickly to the 
applications from towns on behalf of small businesses, perhaps because staff could undermine 
legislative support if they financed too many businesses that failed, if business competitors 
were upset at the advantage subsidized businesses received, or if a business's former 
community protested subsidies received when a business moved to another town. Delays on 
small projects not of particular interest to the governor or key legislators were not damaging 
to the program but could allow time to assess whether business competitors had a strong case 
or whether the firm was using the subsidy to move. 48 
47Auger, personal communication with the author, Feb. 1988. 
48For instance, see file on Hibbing, Mathews Engineering, Small Cities Economic Development Program; 
managers of firms that received Small Cities funds, telephone communication with Kimberlie Garg, winter and 
spring 1989; memoranda on displacement analysis, Policy Analysis Division, Department of Trade and 
Economic Development, St. Paul, MN, 1985-88. 
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The program's staff were not necessarily comfortable with the more complicated 
reality. They jokingly referred to a group with the governor's support that was proposing a 
carpet factory on the Iron Range as "the carpetbaggers." They tried to enforce program 
regulations on the type and number of jobs to be produced by a project or criticized project 
proposals that did not meet guidelines, but they withdrew when the business managers or 
community leaders threatened unfavorable publicity or appealed to elected officials or to 
political appointees in the state's economic development agency.49 
The public story did not eliminate the scrutiny of opinion leaders. For instance, in 
1986 and 1989 the St. Paul newspaper published major stories on inconsistencies and abuses 
in the state's economic development programs, including the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program. Cartoonists for the St. Paul and Minneapolis newspapers frequently 
made fun of the administration's economic development efforts. 
The administrative need to keep the support of the governor and legislators meant that 
little correlation existed between program allocations and regional distress. Further, it meant 
that financing projects most likely to encourage real economic growth had to be a secondary 
objective, even if administrative staff knew how to bring about economic growth. However, 
survival of the program was a precondition for having any impact on economic growth or 
redistribution of economic activity. No matter how well-meaning staff were in wanting to 
achieve the economic growth and redistribution goals of the program, they faced the absolute 
necessity of keeping the program alive if they were to accomplish anything at all. Other 
49Staff of the Small Cities Economic Development Program, St. Paul, MN, personal communication with 
the author, Dec. 1988; files on Hibbing, Mathews Engineering, and Nashwauk, Hydro-Pro, Small Cities 
Economic Development Program; Ron Riegger, R-3 Baits, Moose Lake, telephone interview with Kimberlie 
Garg, winter 1989; Franz Hofmeister, SeaFest, telephone interview with Kimberlie Garg, May 1989. 
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state programs that could have had more economic development effects because of the way 
they decided on projects were also less responsive to political needs. Within four years of 
their start, those programs no longer existed to have any effects. 
As this discussion shows, the bureaucratic perspective is helpful in many respects for 
understanding some observed behavior and explaining the program's lack of success in 
achieving its explicit economic growth and redistribution goals. The perspective leaves key 
issues unaddressed, however. For one, the bureaucratic perspective does not explain the 
motivation for the governor's interest in the program, only the reasons that administrators 
attended to his interest. The governor initiated projects funded by the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program from its beginning. As noted above, the governor's trip through 
southwestern Minnesota in early 1984 to talk with businessmen led to several applications to 
the Small Cities Economic Development Program; and the governor demonstrated initiative 
in other ways as well. The governor's interest existed independently of administrators' 
efforts to demonstrate the usefulness of the program. Similarly, the bureaucratic perspective 
does not explain why legislators were interested in a program like the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program, why so many took the opportunity to announce grants to communities 
in their districts, for instance, or why they would vote for funding the program if projects 
received funding in their districts. 
Further, the public story that program administrators presented is inconsistent i11 an 
important respect with the explanation of behavior the bureaucratic perspective offers. 
Indeed, communities did initiate projects. Although the governor, Mark Dayton (the 
governor's first commissioner of the Department of Energy and Economic Development), 
31 
and several legislators solicited projects, the program's staff did not. Such administrative 
passivity is inconsistent with a perspective that explains results entirely in terms of 
bureaucratic politics. The bureaucratic perspective deals only with the "supply" side in a 
political market for economic development projects. An additional explanation is needed for 
the "demand" side, for why elected officials see such projects as important. 
Political Imperatives in a Private Enterprise Market-Oriented Society5° 
A third major framework for explaining state and local economic development 
programs' shortcomings focuses on political imperatives in a "private enterprise market-
oriented society," where managers of huge bureaucratized corporations and the owners of 
individual and family enterprises make many economic decisions.51 This perspective 
suggests that the requirements of public office lead elected officials to take actions that are 
often inconsistent with achieving the explicit goals of economic development programs to 
encourage economic growth or to redistribute growth to distressed areas and to low- and 
moderate-income people. 
State and local officials run for office from geographic districts, and they must seek 
re-election at least once every four years. To win re-election they need to demonstrate 
concern about the welfare of the people in their districts. Public projects have an especially 
important role in this process. As Hanson pointed out in his study of the Minnesota 
legislature, "Legislators tend assiduously to serve groups of constituents by securing projects 
and programs that help them economically .... This 'pork' helps establish the member's 
.50'fhe term is Charles Lindblom's. See Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-
Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 
51Lindblom, Politics and Markets, ch. 7. 
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reputation as one who can deliver for the district, and builds political support that may cross 
party lines and ideologies. "52 Mayors also need to attract projects to their jurisdictions. 
Because state and local elected officials run for re-election so often, their perspective is 
short-term. They must show results for constituents quickly. 
In regions experiencing economic distress where unemployment and low incomes are 
key issues of public concern, economic development programs are exceptionally valuable for 
delivering projects quickly. A grant to a community to be loaned to a business is 
newsworthy, and legislators and_ mayors can claim credit for delivering the funds that many 
people believe will increase employment. 
The dilemma is that the kinds of activities that are highly visible, that lend themselves 
to announcements and groundbrealtj.ng ceremonies, do not necessarily bring about economic 
activity that would not have occurred anyway in the community or in a nearby town.53 
Elected officials have no reason to assess whether a business can undertake a project without 
public funds, whether a business would locate in a community without a subsidy, or whether 
a subsidy would have more economic development effect if it went to a different firm 
instead. Such questioning runs the risk of antagonizing business managers and generating 
unfavorable publicity at the same time that it undermines public confidence that delivery of 
the grant to the community is significant. 
52R.oyce Hanson, Tribune of the People: The Minnesota Legislature and Its Leadership (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 19. 
53For details on this issue with respect to the Small Cities Economic Development Program, see Dew~r, 
"Inside State and Local Economic Development Programs," and Dewar and Hagenlocker, "Getting to the 
Bottom Line on Low-Interest Loans to Business." 
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Activities that are not so visible or quick may better encourage real economic growth. 
For example, a program to teach entrepreneurs how to do business plans may be more 
effective in encouraging actual economic growth, but the results of such a program are hard 
to see and measure, and the program's activities attract little attention. The program does 
not meet the important political needs of elected officials to deliver projects to their districts 
quickly and visibly. 
Although they opt for visible, quick, often unpromising projects, bringing about 
economic growth is very important to political leaders. Business decision makers choose 
locations for economic activity, levels of investment, technology to utiiize, numbers of 
employees to hire, the kinds of workers hired at what salaries in what kinds of work, and the 
products and services to be produced. These decisions determine the· level and geographic 
pattern of unemployment, the geographic distribution of wealth and income, the distribution 
of income among groups of people, the value of property, and the solvency of city 
governments. In industrial sectors where market power is concentrated in a few firms, as in 
many types of manufacturing, business decision makers have considerable autonomy. In 
sectors where no small group of firms dominates, however, business decision makers have 
less choice about the actions they must take to keep a firm in operation. The decisions that 
private business actors make have such important implications that public officials take great 
interest in the results of the decisions and seek to influence them. State and local elected 
officials, however, have little power to affect levels of employment and income.54 
54Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets, chap. 13; Stephen L. Elkin, City and Regime in the American 
Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), chaps. 2, 3. 
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Elected officials' immediate incentives to pursue visible, short-term projects they can 
deliver to their districts combine with the importance of trying to affect economic growth to 
drive state and local political systems to provide many programs and large sums of public 
funds for economic development. At the same time, these forces mean that many programs 
are not effective in encouraging growth or redistributing growth and income to distressed 
areas. Some voters become increasingly disillusioned with the pro~ises of the programs. 
As Robert Mier, the Chicago commissioner of economic development in the Harold 
Washington administration, has argued, grandiose economic development projects are like 
"time bombs" that will bring about explosions of constituent anger because they have not 
fulfilled their promise. 55 The continuing, unsolved economic development problems and 
growing public criticism lead to repeated search for other programs and to the reform of 
state economic development policy not only with the election of a new governor, but also in 
mid-term. The turnover and disruption contribute to the inability of programs to encourage 
economic growth or achieve redistribution to distressed areas. 
This scenario plays itself out in the large regions of the United States with economic 
development problems. As Elkin has pointed out, however, inducing private investment in 
highly visible land use projects is crucial to local officials' ability to get re-elected in any 
local economic circumstances. 56 In prosperous areas, delivery of public projects that affect 
land value and the quality of life are important, especially for the interests whose property 
values are affected, but the projects need not be for economic development per se nor aimed 
55Robert Mier, professor of urban planning, University of Illinois-Chicago, comments in a session of the 
conference of the American Collegiate Schools of Planning, Portland, OR, Oct. 1989. 
56Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic, chap. 3. 
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at job creation or reduction of unemployment. 57 In less prosperous state and local 
economies, economic development issues are salient. 
This perspective matches the experience of the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program in many respects but fails to explain the program's activities in other ways. The 
discussion below considers first how state and local officials' use of the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program is consistent with the perspective that emphasizes political 
imperatives in a private enterprise market-oriented society, then looks at inconsistencies. 
--The Governor's View 
When Governor Rudy Perpich took office in January 1983, the state was suffering 
from recession. Not only was iron ore mining depressed, but agriculture, forestry, and older 
manufacturing were also in trouble. As a consequence, nonmetropolitan areas of the state 
had lost much of their economic base. By 1985, economic disparities between metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan areas of the state had become an important political issue. The 
governor needed and wanted to address the regional economic problems. As Perpich stated 
when he came into office, the central goal of his administration would be "job creation and 
economic recovery, achieved through a partnership between the public and private sectors." 
Two years later he told Minnesotans, "I know what it's like to need a job and not have one. 
I know what it's like to face the loss of home and community .... I want you to know that I 
will not rest in my efforts until all Minnesotans share in our improving economy. "58 
57For a case study of the importance of project delivery that affects property values in a prosperous region, 
see Barbara Crosby and John Bryson, "Stadium Wars: Minneapolis, 1971-85," University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis, MN, undated and unpublished draft manuscript. 
58-fext of Governor Perpich's State of the State address, Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 11 Jan. 1985, p. 4B. 
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The governor used the Small Cities Economic Development Program as one tool in 
his efforts to encourage economic development. The record of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program suggests that the governor could also pursue at least two other goals 
of importance at the same time. For one, he needed to consolidate and reinforce support for 
re-election. The support had a regional dimension, and therefore, regional development 
projects were useful for strengthening this backing. The governor had received the votes of 
a high percentage of voters in his home region, the Iron Range. The governor pushed for 
regional development programs.that could help this area and other distressed places in highly 
visible ways. These programs continued to enable the governor, along with legislators, to 
deliver projects to the region after the area was no longer one of the most economically 
distressed areas of the state. 
The program was not just useful for delivering projects to the Iron Range, however. 
The program provided funds in cases where other communities faced crises, and also enabled 
the governor to take a highly visible role in relieving the problems. For example, in 1983 
Wilson Foods filed for reorganization under the federal bankruptcy code, and its meatpacking 
plant in Albert Lea, Minnesota, was threatened with closing. The governor and the 
· commissioner of the Department of Energy and Economic Development worked closely with 
city officials to arrange financing for local owners to buy the plant. 59 In another case, 
when Unisys closed its plant in Jackson, Minnesota, in 1987, the governor wrote to potential 
businesses, "The State of Minnesota is willing to offer $1 million in incentives to any 
company willing to occupy the Jackson plant and reemploy a significant portion of the idled 
59"Buyer drops out on Wilson plant," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 7 Feb. 1984, p. SB; "Wilson plant 
finds buyer in Albert Lea," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 11 Feb. 1984, p. IC. 
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workforce .... Do not underestimate my commitment to offering a most attractive incentive 
package as a means of encouraging a company to fill the void left by Unisys." In summer 
1987 the Small Cities Economic Development Program provided $500,000 of the funds to 
Raven Industries to do business' out of the Unisys buildings. Although Raven promised only 
70 jobs, in contrast to the 280 lost in the Unisys closing, and as of fall 1987 35 of 40 jobs at 
the plant were filled by workers transferred from another plant in the state, the enthusiasm 
and optimism that the project brought to Jackson were noteworthy. 60 
The Small Cities Economic Development Program was flexible enough to enable the 
governor to promise funds without concern that a project would be rejected. In one case, for 
instance, another state program, driven by more technocratically determined criteria, refused 
to make a loan to an Iron Range group headed by a businessman the governor had recruited 
to revive a proposal for a carpet factory. The commissioner of the Department of Energy 
and Economic Development stepped in to announce that the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program approved the loan. 61 
A second major way the Small Cities Economic Development Program was useful to 
the governor was in managing the politics of the business climate issue. By early 1984 the 
state's high nominal personal income tax rates and its property taxes, unemployment 
compensation rates, and workers compensation rates, which exceeded those of bordering 
states, had become rallying points for the governor's opposition within the state's business 
,6lfile on Jackson, Astoria Industries, Small Cities Economic Development Program; Jake Jatras, "Jackson 
welcomes Raven,• Jackson County Pilot, 13 Aug. 1987, p. 1. 
61Lynda McDonnell, "State loan to Paulucci questioned,• St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 5 April 1987, pp. 
1A,.9A. 
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community. When the Independent Republicans gained control of the state's House of 
Representatives in the 1984 election, they promised to address these issues. The governor 
needed to reduce the visibility of the business climate issue, or he could be forced to abandon 
some of his central programs to focus on taxes of concern to the business community. 
The governor's trip through southwestern Minnesota in early 1984 aimed to 
demonstrate to business owners that his administration was prepared to go to lengths to make 
Minnesota a better place to do business. The efforts also may have prevented several 
newsmaking decisions to relocate or expand businesses in the Dakotas rather than in 
Minnesota. Funds available through the Small Cities Economic Development Program were 
important for this effort as the governor promised financing on the spot. 
The governor took an entrepreneurial role in selling Minnesota to the managers of 
large corporations whose public statements had a disproportionate impact on the perception 
of the business climate. 62 The Small Cities Economic· Development Program backed him up 
by providing subsidies to large corporations that had announced they were considering a 
move from the state and to other big firms that indicated they might be willing to locate in 
the state. The governor placed particular importance on these businesses' decisions. 
Countering criticism of a subsidy to a plant on the Iron Range to produce chopsticks for 
export to Japan, the governor pointed out, "Minnesota's economic development program has 
had hundreds of successes, including the expansions of ETA Systems in St. Paul, Beatrice 
Meats, Inc., in St. James, and Lake Superior Paper Industries in Duluth. In addition, NCR 
62u>ri Sturdevant and Robert Whereatt, "Perpich: his travel has lured 7,000 jobs to state," Minneapolis Star 
and Tribune, 17 Nov. 1985, p. lA; controversy over the 3M announcement that a research and development 
branch would locate in Austin, Texas, rather than in Minnesota was reported in the Minneapolis Star and 
Tribune and St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch in early 1984. 
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Comten recently invested in a major new facility in Blaine and portions of Telex and 
Diamond Match have moved their operations to Minnesota. "63 All but one of the 
companies the governor cited had received funding through the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program. 
The Small Cities Economic Development Program approved funds for 22 large 
corporations, and three of these received more than one grant or loan. Nearly 20 percent of 
Small Cities Economic Development Program funds. went to these companies, although they 
made up only a little more than 10 percent of the firms assisted by the program. The 
subsidies were especially attractive. In forty percent of the cases, the funds were offered as 
grants to the company rather than as loans. In contrast, in the program as a whole, only 
one-eighth of cases where funds were approved for businesses involved grants for the 
businesses rather than loans. Almost 70 percent of the projects approved for funding for 
large corporations were for at least $250,000, compared to about one-third for the program 
as a whole. And as a manager of SeaFest (a division of International Multifoods) stated, 
when state staff people tried .to insist on a connection between funding and the type and 
number of jobs in the company's subsidized Motley plant, he asked the commissioner of 
DEED to intervene to assure that the plant needed to meet no such requirements. 64 
The Small Cities Economic Development Program served as a responsive source of 
funds for the governor in his dealings with big corporations. The governor or his economic 
development commissioner often announced a subsidy to a large corporation through the 
63Rudy Perpich, letter to the editor, St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 27 Aug. 1987, p. 18A. 
64Franz Hofmeister, SeaFest, telephone interview with Kimberlie Garg, May 1989. 
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Small Cities Economic Development Program before program staff received or approved an 
application for the funds. 65 
The grants and loans for big corporations revealed an uneasy alliance of political and 
business elites. Corporate management often stated that they were deciding on a location and 
considering a variety of sites, some in the state and some outside. The governor and the 
commissioner of DEED, later DTED, moved to provide the funds not only from the Small 
Cities Economic Development Program but also from other sources. The payoff was high to 
leading state elected officials of.an announcement that the governor's role made the 
difference in a company decision to locate or expand in the state. Unlike many Small Cities 
Economic Development Program projects, large numbers of jobs were involved. The other 
side to the opportunity, however, was a threat. The cost to the governor, as well as to 
legislative leadership, was high of an announcement that a firm was leaving or deciding not 
to expand within the state because of a bad business climate or uncooperative state officials. 
The decision of Economics Laboratory to move its international division from White 
Plains, New York, to St. Paul where the company had its headquarters illustrates the mix of 
cooperation and hostility between elected officials, the state economic development 
commissioner, and the management of a large corporation. In late 1984 Jon Grunseth, vice 
president of Economics Laboratory, publicly opposed the budget request for the state's 
Department of Energy and Economic Development. "We as a business community have 
watched announcements from companies moving all or some of their facilities from 
65For instance, see files on Pipestone, Bayliner Marine; Lake County, Louisiana Pacific; Worthington, Swift 
Packing, files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program; Josephine Marcotty, "Blandin expansion 
back on track," St. Paul Pioneer Press Difil)atch, 29 July 1987. 
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Minnesota .... We need statewide, across-the-board economic incentives for all businesses 
and all individuals if we are going to protect the tax base of this state," he wrote. "The 
'quality of life in Minnesota' is no longer sufficient to offset our high tax, transportation and 
energy-source disadvantages. "66 Less than a year later, Grunseth began negotiations for the 
Economics Laboratory effort to get its share of the funds from the economic development 
programs he criticized, asking the state and the city to pay for costs of moving a division to 
St. Paul. The data Grunseth presented to those accustomed to assessing financial packages 
showed how irrelevant the numbers really were. The figures showed the cost of the move 
but not the costs of operation in alternative sites once the one-time expenditure was made. 
The company received a $500,000 grant from the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program along with more than $1.8 million from other state sources, the city, and the St. 
Paul Port Authority.67 In 1990 Grunseth became the Independent-Republican·candidate for 
governor running against Perpich and attacking his efforts to encourage economic 
development in the state. 
What were the implications of the governor's activities for the effectiveness of the 
Small Cities Economic Development Program in achieving its explicit goals? In some ways 
the efforts reinforced the goals and in other ways undermined them. Aid to the Iron Range 
or to cities with plant closings did not necessarily mean that assistance went to the areas with 
the greatest distress. Four of the twenty-two large corporations that received funds were 
66Jon Grunseth, letter to the editor, St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 25 Nov. 1984, p. G2. 
671..etters and memoranda in St. Paul, Economics Laboratory, files of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program; Lynda McDonnell, "Econ Lab moving division to St. Paul," St. Paul Pioneer Press 
Dispatch, 15 Jan. 1986, p. SB. 
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located in the prosperous Twin Cities metropolitan area. Research shows that financial 
subsidies to large corporations rarely make a difference in a location or expansion 
decision. 68 Although the managers' part of the political deal in getting a subsidy was to say 
that the funds were key to the big companies' location or expansion decisions, half of those 
interviewed said they probably or definitely would have gone ahead with the project without 
the funds. The company had enough cash to finance its expansion, said the manager of 
Network Systems in Brooklyn Park who had been involved in negotiations for the funds from 
the Small Cities Economic Development Program, but they needed some incentive to tell the 
board of directors about to help justify staying in the Twin Cities. The grant the company 
received, $250,000, was "peanuts" to their large operation, he said, and the state should 
make more funds available to companies like his, as other states would have. When Telex 
managers decided to move operations to Blue Earth and LeSueur, they contacted the 
Department of Energy and Economic Development to inquire about funding and received a 
loan of $125,000 for each of the two plants; the loans were useful, but the location decision 
had been made. 69 
Whether or not the subsidies led to economic growth or redistribution of economic 
activity to more distressed areas of the state, the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program may well have been effective as one tool the governor used in managing the politics 
of the business climate issue. Good will about the business climate can mean that more 
businesses make decisions to locate and expand in a state than otherwise would have. 
68Roger W. Schmenner, Making Business Location Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 
pp. 51-53. 
69-'felephone interviews with Kimberlie Garg, winter and spring 1989. 
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Defusing controversy over the business climate also gives a governor more room for action 
on other issues of importance. 
--Legislators' Use of the Program 
The Small Cities Economic Development Program was also important to legislators 
and local elected officials in demonstrating that they were bringing development to their 
districts. Legislators frequently announced grants. Legislators and mayors received credit 
for the funds. Local newspapers often reported the stories on their front pages and praised 
elected officials on their editorial pages no matter how small the grant.70 At the same time, 
as Todd Otis, chair of the House committee concerned with economic development, pointed 
out, economic development projects might be a risky kind of "pork" and could hurt an 
elected official because of what he called the "5 percent rule." Five percent of the voters 
would closely scrutinize the project claims and could be very critical; 5 percent of voters 
could swing almost any election. 71 
Although delivery of projects was important to all legislators, the emphasis on 
delivery of "pork" in their "home style, ,m the role they played with constituents in their 
districts, differed from one legislator to another. Arnold has noted that big city congressmen 
care less about federal allocations to their districts than do congressmen from districts outside 
big cities. Minnesota legislators from cities with numerous districts, especially St. Paul and 
'101finnesota local newspapers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN. 
71 Comments of Todd Otis at a meeting on economic development in the Minnesota House of Representatives 
office building in the late 1980s, reported by Julia Friedman, professor of economics, Macalester College, St. 
Paul, telephone communication with the author, June 1992. 
72Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978). 
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Minneapolis; tended to pay much less attention to the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program than did legislators from the nonmetropo~itan areas. Arnold's generalizations about 
Congress suggest several reasons for less interest from Twin Cities legislators. 73 First, 
legislators have more difficulty generating personal publicity with grant announcements; the 
major Twin Cities newspapers have other news to print of greater interest. Second, a 
legislator has trouble getting credit from constituents for a grant. Any grant benefits many 
people outside the legislator's district; indeed, most beneficiaries might be from outside the 
district. With many legislators representing the city, constituents have trouble knowing 
which legislator actually deserves the credit for a grant. Finally, most grants from the Small 
Cities Economic Development Program are small enough to seem unimpressive to 
constituents in a large city. 
Even among those who came from outside the more densely populated cities, 
however, legislators differed in the extent to which they emphasized project delivery and the 
delivery of economic development projects, in particular, in their relations with their 
constituents. For most Iron Range legislators the delivery of projects was especially 
important, and they worked together to get more economic development funds for allocation 
of projects to their region through the Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Board, funds 
they controlled, but also through special appropriations and through more general programs 
like the Small Cities Economic Development Program.74 One Iron Range legislator, 
Douglas Johnson, was chair of the Senate Tax Committee, a position of influence over the 
73 Arnold,. Congress and the Bureaucracy. pp. 34-5. 
74For example, see Dewar, "Development Analysis Confronts Politics"; Hanson, Tribune of the People, p. 
119. 
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delivery of projects to other districts as well as his own. Unlike many legislators, Johnson 
was active in recruiting businesses for funding through the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program as well as other economic development programs. As one 
businessman stated, he was planning to build his factory in the Twin Cities metropolitan area 
until Johnson told him about the subsidies available if he came to the Iron Range.75 
Legislators were creative in claiming the funds of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program for their districts and receiving the credit for the funding. In 1987 the 
deputy commissioner of the Department of Energy and Economic Development announced a 
"line of credit" for Fergus Falls. Two hundred thousand dollars from the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program would be available for specific businesses when the Small 
Cities Economic Development Program staff approved applications. If the funds were not 
used within six months, the department would reconsider whether the money should be kept 
in reserve or made available to other communities. News accounts praised the state 
representative from the district for his key role in making the funding possible.76 Despite 
the publicity, the arrangement with the state agency did not seem to differ from the situation 
any city faced. Any city had the opportunity to receive funds of $200,000 on behalf of 
businesses approved by the state agency staff; the six-month deadline meant that the funds 
would not be held so long that they would be needed for other projects before the budget for 
the year was depleted. 
75Joe Foodie, East Range Technologies, Aurora, MN, telephone communication with Kimberlie Garg, 
winter 1989. 
76Kathy Berdan, "State to give city $200,000," Fergus Falls Daily Journal, 25 March 1987; Kathy Berdan, 
"City's loan pool swells by $200,000," Fergus Falls Daily Journal, 3 March 1987, p. 1; "No small potatoes," 
editorial, Fergus Falls Daily Journal, 1987, in the clipping files of the library of Minnesota Department of 
Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul. 
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In 1988, a representative introduced legislation that earmarked $800,000 of Small 
Cities Economic Development Program funds for economic development projects in areas 
where at least four local units of government cooperated to adopt school district consolidation 
plans. The legislation in effect took funds from the appropriation for the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program away from the control of the agency in St. Paul and offered 
it to organizations concerned with economic development in subregions of the state. As of 
1989, several communities in the legislator's own district were the only ones to take 
advantage of the funding. Why did the legislator earmark the resources of the economic 
development program? "Because it was easy to do," one lobbyist explained, especially easier 
than getting a !lew program or a new appropriation for the same endeavor. 77 
The importance to legislators of delivering projects to their districts made the program 
helpful in legislative leaders' efforts to manage their caucus and to secure the passage of 
legislation they considered important. Senate Majority Leader Roger Moe and his staff had a 
close relationship with the deputy commissioner for community development in the 
Department of Trade and Economic Development. Moe sponsored legislation to place more 
economic development programs under the control of the dep~ty commissioner in 1987 and, 
in 1991, advocated using funds earmarked for assistance to displaced workers for subsidies to 
businesses administered by the deputy commissioner. 78 Moe's district received no more 
grants than most others, and Moe did not use grants to other districts to generate publicity 
nLaws of Minnesota, Ch. 686, Art. l(o), 1988; "Economic Development: $1,000,000 Economic 
Development Fund Nears Completion," Regional Outlook (of the Upper Minnesota Valley Regional 
Development Commission) 10, no. 8 (Feb. 1989): 1; Stoesz, fall 1988. 
78Ensign et al.; Stoesz, Aug. 1991. 
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for himself throughout the state. Given the importance of managing a diverse legislative 
caucus, however, significant influence over projects that constituted important "pork" to 
many legislators from nonmetropolitan areas must have been helpful. 
What were the effects on achieving the programs' explicit goals of legislators' efforts 
to deliver projects to their home districts? The economic development funds did not 
necessarily go for the kinds of activities that would bring about economic growth. The 
amount of "pork" that legislators brought home did not correlate strongly with an area's 
economic distress. As legislators sought to act quickly and visibly to deal with economic 
development problems, as they had to in order to make re-election more likely, the explicit 
goals of the program did not determine the ways projects were funded. 
--The Perspective of Local Officials 
Local elected officials, most often mayors, also received credit and favorable publicity 
associated with the Small Cities Economic Development Program's grants. For many in 
areas of the state that had lost economic activity, new development was needed to help 
balarice city budgets. Many mayors took important leadership positions in economic 
development initiatives in their communities. Observing the lack of employment 
opportunities for residents and facing budget problems as people moved away and left empty 
houses, Babbitt Mayor Don Cole sought funding from the Small Cities Program for a tire 
recycling plant whose parent company was based in ·the Twin Cities area and for the 
expansion of a local entrepreneur's cabinet shop as part of an all-out effort to encourage new 
industries in his Iron Range town.79 
79Sharon Schmickle, "Families cling to home on range," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 25 Sept. 1983, p. 
SA; Babbit, Kasson Manufacturing and Rubber Research Elastomerics, files of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program. · 
48 
In numerous communities outside the Twin Cities mayors formed alliances, often 
formal ones, with other interests in their communities that would benefit from promoting 
growth. In Albert Lea, Mayor 0. H. Barnes and other civic leaders recruited a local 
businessman to buy the threatened Wilson Foods plant with the help of a Small Cities 
Economic Development Program grant and other public subsidies. Although the meatpacking 
plant involved the most jobs and generated the most statewide publicity, "Jobs, Inc.," an 
organization of public, commercial, and financial leaders in the county, took on numerous 
. 
economic development initiatives to address plant closings that threatened many jobs.80 In 
Jackson, Mayor Dave Fell applauded the Raven Industries plant, saying, "We want to bask a 
little bit in the glory." The Jackson Development Group, a nonprofit business group that 
formed in response to the city's economic development problems, continued to take a 
leadership role to promote development in the city. 81 In response to plant closings in 
Fergus Falls, elected officials and business leaders formed "Project 500," vowing to bring 
500 jobs to the city in 500 days. They formed a port authority, created the Western 
Minnesota Industries Loan Pool, and took advantage of state programs to offer financing to 
businesses interested in expanding or locating in the city. 82 
Although the biggest cities' legislators did not take visible roles in the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program's funding of projects, mayors often did. In St. Paul, 
80Lee Egerstrom, "Determined town devises strategy for buying plants," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 29 
April 1986, p. lB, SB. 
81Jatras, "Jackson welcomes Raven," p. 1; Dave Peters, "1 year later, Jackson thrives," St. Paul Pioneer 
Press Dispatch, 7 Dec. 1987, p. Dl. 
82Toni O'Brien, Port Authority, personal communication with the author, Fergus Falls, MN, Aug. 1988; 
"Economic Development Update," Fergus Falls Port Authority, Fergus Falls, MN, Jan. 1988. 
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Mayor George Latimer, whose administration was active in the city's development, heard 
that Ideal Security Hardware was considering a move out of the city and worked with the St. 
Paul Port Authority to get Urban Development Action Grant funds from Washington, D. C., 
along with a loan for the company from the Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
The mayor's announcement of the loan to Ideal Security emphasized that the project would 
employ workers laid off in the closing of a Whirlpool plant earlier that year: "We have all 
agonized over the dislocation of men and women who have worked hard all their lives and 
through no fault of their own are out of a job. Now we can do something for at least some 
of them. "83 In Rochester, Mayor Chuck Hazama announced funding from the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program for a soy sauce factory, a joint venture between a Chinese 
food processing firm and a local restaurant owner. 84 
Adding to the attractiveness of the Small Cities Economic Development Program was 
the fact that cities could keep at least some of the funds that a business repaid for a revolving 
loan fund for economic development. The loan fund could be used for other visible 
economic development projects in a community. Applications often seemed designed to 
succeed in bringing the funds to the community for a revolving loan fund. In Foreston, for 
instance, Woodcraft Industries received a loan to build a water tower. Without the Small 
Cities Economic Development Program funds, the company would have built an underground 
83Boyd Bowman, Ideal Security Hardware Co., telephone interview with Kimberlie Garg, spring 1989; 
"Officials make deal for jobs," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 11 Dec. 1984, p. Cl. 
84Janice Gregorson, "March start is expected for Rochester soy sauce plant," Rochester's Post-Bulletin, 25 
Oct. 1985, p. 27. 
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reservoir at half the cost. The tower was better for the town, said the manager at 
Woodcraft, because the town would get a revolving loan program.85 
Working with mayors and city councils were economic development entrepreneurs, 
people whose jobs existed because of the state and local emphasis on economic development. 
They were sometimes urban planners or former bank loan officers employed by a city, 
sometimes self-employed consultants with contra,cts with numerousjurisdictions, sometimes 
staff in consulting firms or regional organizations. The economic development entrepreneurs 
were skilled in writing grant applications, dealing with state agency staff, and managing 
grant awards. They also took initiative in promoting economic development efforts. They 
sold their local areas to businesses considering relocation; they visited local businesses in 
search of candidates for loans; they brought groups together to work for economic 
development in an area. In Barrett, for instance, economic development consultant Gene 
Wenstrom (a former state representative) convinced a company to provide a family with a 
month at a resort on a lake to overcome their reluctance to move from the Twin Cities area 
and therefore to encourage the company's move. An urban planner working for Cottage 
Grove noticed a news article saying that another community's efforts to provide a site for Up 
North Plastics were encountering problems. He contacted Up North Plastics and eventually 
convinced management to locate in Cottage Grove instead. 86 
85Don Swanstrom, Woodcraft Industries, Foreston, MN, telephone interview with Kimbe~lie Garg, Feb. 
1989. 
ueiene Wenstrom, economic development consultant, personal communication with the author, Elbow Lake, 
MN, Aug. 1988; Richard Lewis, former city planner for Cottage Grove, telephone communication with the 
author, Dec. 1988. 
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The economic development professional's position depended on the enthusiasm of 
local elected officials about his or her work. Just as local elected officials benefited from 
highly visible projects, so did economic development entrepreneurs. As John Levy, a former 
economic development· official, states, "If the body politic does not know what the economic 
developer is doing, he or she may not be doing it much longer--no matter how good the 
economic developer may be. "87 The Small Cities Economic Development Program was 
ideal for generating high visibility projects, and it was popular among economic development 
entrepreneurs. Wenstrom argued, "The legislature should double the funding for the 
Economic Recovery Grants." He criticized a major new state program, the Greater 
Minnesota Corporation, aimed at stimulating longer term economic development--"We need 
help now. It grates on us because we have to have something now. "88 
What were the results of mayors' and economic development entrepreneurs' efforts to 
encourage growth in their communities through the use of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program? On one hand, they affected the growth of their own communities in 
cases where development would not have occurred otherwise. However, the competition for 
development meant that funds did not necessarily go disproportionately to the most distressed 
jurisdictions. They went to those areas where elected officials and economic development 
entrepreneurs took the most initiative and where businesses were eligible for financing. In 
addition, even when local officials identified projects that meant growth for their 
communities, these projects did not necessarily produce growth for the state as a whole 
87John M. Levy, "What Local Economic Developers Actually Do: Location Quotients Versus Press 
Releases," Journal of the American Planning Association 56, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 157. 
s&wenstrom, Aug. 1988. 
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because they displaced other projects that would have occurred in the region or elsewhere in 
the state. 
Other interests rarely counteracted the local officials' parochialism. Although the 
staff of the program tried to avoid financing the "pirating" of businesses by communities 
from other parts of the state, they evaluated applications without consideration of the regional 
context. Cokato, for instance, received financing for a business that moved from a site 
sixteen miles away after choosing among sites in several towns in the county. The city of 
Courtland received a grant after arguing that its proximity to the larger cities of New Ulm 
and Mankato made attracting new businesses difficult. An application from Lake Crystal 
noted concern about "dependence" on the larger city of Mankato despite population growth 
and low unemployment. For achieving goals of employing new workers or encouraging 
growth in a distressed area or in the state as a whole, affecting a location among nearby 
jurisdictions was unimportant. 89 
--The Role of a Public Story 
To sustain the support of opinion leaders at the same time that the program met 
political requirements, program staff and elected officials maintained a distinction between 
the public story of what the program did and the private reality. The public story was that 
the Small Cities Economic Development program aimed to encourage state and local 
economic growth and to help distressed areas and low- and moderate-income people. In 
public view legislators enthusiastically supported a program with this stated objective. The 
public story stated that the governor and the legislature backed the program in order to deal 
89See files on Cokato, Pick Industries; Courtland, Martens Distributing; Lake Crystal, Crysteel 
Manufacturing, Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
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with the economic development problems of distressed communities and to create jobs. 
When the program made outright grants to large corporations, these were for infrastructure, 
the program staff stated. Where grants to businesses could not be categorized as 
infrastructure, they were "incentive" funds to make up the difference in costs between the 
site chosen and another site in another state. These funds were crucial to the company's 
location decision, staff argued. 
This public story was true, but the private reality was more complicated, as the 
preceding discussion has shown. The goals stated in the legislation and regulations were not 
the only important goals, although everyone would have been pleased to achieve those. The 
most important aim was to give the appearance of success in dealing with economic 
development problems by delivering projects to the districts of elected officials and by giving 
highly visible subsidies to major corporations. 
--Inconsistencies with Political Imperatives 
As this discussion demonstrates, the performance of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program is consistent in many ways with the perspective that comes out of an 
assessment of political imperatives in a private enterprise market-oriented society. However, 
the experience of the program is also inconsistent with the perspective in several respects. 
First, elected officials needed the cooperation of program administrators. Conflict between 
elected officials and administrators would threaten to expose the private reality of the 
program and undermine its public support as well as interfere with the program's serving 
important political needs. ff staff did not cooperate in meeting the needs of elected officials, 
the program would not exist for long. The viewpoint of political imperatives in a private 
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enterprise market-oriented society has to be supplemented with the bureaucratic perspective 
to offer a complete picture of how state and local economic development programs work. 
Second, research on economic development in big cities shows that political leaders, 
business elites, and other pro-growth interests often form "regimes" to promote development 
that enhances land values. 90 Even more of the program funds might have been expected to 
go to big businesses than was the case. State tax and regulatory policy and economic 
development programs considered together might well show more evidence of the alliance of 
business and political elites. The Small Cities Economic Development Program may not 
have had enough funds to be worth tapping large amounts for the needs of big business. In 
addition, because the legislation, reflecting the federal direction, aims funds at projects that 
benefit low- and moderate-income· people, businesses that could not meet federal employment 
requirements often did not take advantage of the program. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, the tone of the perspective on the political 
imperatives facing governors, legislators, and city officials does not do justice to the passion 
with which state and local officials desired and sought economic growth and prosperity for 
the state and for their communities. Promoting economic development with the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program was indeed good politics, but it was also a goal that the 
governor, legislators, mayors, and other elected officials very much wanted to achieve. 
Perhaps indeed, as technocrats would argue, if they had been armed with greater 
understanding of what actions would bring about actual economic growth, they would have 
chosen more successful approaches. 
9ClClarence N. Stone and Heywood T. Sanders, The Politics of Urban Development (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1987); Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic. 
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Implications for Making Regional Development Programs More Effective 
Evaluations of state and local economic development programs typically conclude with 
technocratic recommendations for ways to make the programs better achieve their goals. 
The argument of this paper has been that recommendations that ignore the political forces 
that deflect programs from their objectives are unlikely to improve the programs. The 
solutions derived from "tenseless arguments" 91 regarding artificially delineated problems are 
not actually solutions. Considering the political economy of programs, however, shows more 
clearly the difficulty of identifying any reforms that can make the programs more effective in 
dealing with regional economic distress and bringing about economic growth. The problem 
becomes one that cannot be a "problem" in the technocratic framework of policy analysis 
because it is not "solvable by specific organizations in a particular arena of action. "92 
Two aims of reform should be, first, to make locally initiated projects more likely to 
achieve the explicit economic development goals and, second, to reduce the political benefits 
of delivering projects that will not achieve the program's goals. To achieve the first aim, 
efforts should be initiated to help people in distressed communities to understand the 
character of their economies and to develop realistic expectations of what they can become 
and what kinds of efforts can lead to growth. The community economic assessment program 
of the Minnesota Extension Service is the kind of program that can play a major role in this 
effort because community people are involved in learning how to look at their local economy 
91Thomas J. Kaplan, "The Narrative Structure of Policy Analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 5, no. 4 (Summer 1986): 776. 
92Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1987), p. 26. 
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and at potential intervention. 93 Minnesota's Star Cities Program held the potential to help 
by encouraging communities to inventory their economic situation. 
As DTED staff argue, if they do not fund enough proposals in distressed areas of the 
state, it is because they do not receive enough proposals for viable projects from those areas. 
Therefore, potential economic development entrepreneurs in the most distressed communities 
need training in understanding their local communities and the kinds of efforts most likely to 
lead to growth. They need training about how to take advantage of state programs to bring 
more funds to the most distressed areas. 
Better understanding of ·the local economy and of the kinds of efforts that lead to 
economic growth makes it more likely that more of the projects proposed will ·actually lead 
to growth in a distressed area. In addition, as this knowledge becomes more widespread, 
elected officials and economic development entrepreneurs gain less political reward for 
visible projects that do not lead to actual economic growth because citizens understand how 
little effect a particular, visible project may have. 
Rewards still would exist for local officials, however, that can undermine the 
effectiveness of a program to encourage economic growth in distressed areas. Highly visible 
efforts still offer more political benefits than activities that are less visible but might have 
more effect. Just as important, local efforts that help one community at the expense of a 
nearby jurisdiction remain attractive for local officials, and local officials will continue to. 
undertake projects, for instance, to keep their own main street going in competition with 
93Claudia Parliament, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, initiated 
this program in Minnesota. Another example is the community economic assessment program that Ron Shaffer 
administers at the University of Wisconsin. 
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another town's or to advocate a project to help a firm relocate from another city in the area. 
State programs need to take the perspective of a larger region, promote cooperation among 
the local jurisdictions in an area in economic development, and refuse to subsidize projects 
that have the effect of moving economic activity around the region unless a business is 
moving from a prosperous area to a distressed area. As this paper has shown, a regional 
approach can reduce parochialism, but little incentive exists among decision makers at the 
state level to take such an approach. 94 
To achieve the second aim of reform, to reduce the political benefits of delivering 
projects that do not achieve the program's aims, the citizens of the state need more 
opportunities to learn about how economic development programs work and about how 
economic growth and the redistribution of economic activity occur. In Minnesota, groups 
such as Citizens League committees, the Legislative Auditors office, and the policy analysis 
division of DTED provide some of this information. More widespread knowledge of how 
economic development occurs can help the public in judging whether highly visible projects 
actually help a community or the state and can reduce the political reward for projects that 
do not merit funding. 
In short, howev_~r, no approach can transform business loan programs for state and 
local economic developme.nt into highly effective efforts at achieving their explicit aims. 
Many incentives will continue to exist to use the programs in ways that deflect them from 
achieving their economic development goals as well as they could. 
94J'he IR administrat.ion that took office in Minnesota in early 1991 has begun to promote a regional 
approach to economic development (Thomas Stinson, state economist, Minnesota Department of Finance, 
personal communication with the author, St. Paul, MN, Aug. 1991). 
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As this paper has shown, economic development programs aimed at encouraging 
economic growth and helping distressed regions do serve important public functions that are 
not related to their explicit goals.95 A governor may use such a program to manage· the 
politics of the business climate issue so that disputes over truces that affect businesses or 
wealthier individuals do not push most other equally important issues off the political agenda. 
A legislative leader may use such a program to manage a caucus with diverse interests in 
order to get constructive legislation passed. Providing a project for a legislator's district is a 
less expensive trade for a vote than compromises on other legislation (such as a funding 
formula for state aids to local units of government) can be. Whether these uses of economic 
development subsidies are beneficial to state and local economies or redistribute economic 
activity to distressed areas depends on the nature of the other policies the governor and the 
legislative leadership are advocating. Whether a well-informed citizen would see this use of 
economic development programs as helpful would depend on whether he or she shares the 
values of the governor and the legislative leadership. 
Community leaders can use a program such as the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program along with a variety of other economic development tools to make 
positive differences in their local economies. For communities, however, others kinds of 
programs may be just as helpful as this one. If funding for regional development programs 
such as the Small Cities Economic Development Program remains a small fraction of the 
state budget, the programs may be useful to some communities, although not as helpful as 
95For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Dewar, Nelson, and Stinson, "The Political Character of 
Targeted Area Development." 
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they could be in bringing about state economic growth and in helping particularly distressed 
areas. 
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